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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint and 
allowing her to proceed under her Second Complaint? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Krouse vs. 
Bower, 2001 UT 28, 20 P.3D 895, 897 (Utah 2001). 
Issue Preserved: Record p. 118, interior pages 3 (lines 9 through 21), 4 (lines 2 through 
7) 6 (lines 6 through 22), 7 (lines 8 through 12), 9 (lines 20 through 25), and 10 (lines 1 through 
9). 
2. Whether Mark Sullivan filed his Illinois action in a timely manner? 
Standard Review: The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 
(Utah App. 1998). 
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, interior page 4 (lines 2 through 24) and interior page 15 
(lines 15 through 20); Record pages 257 and 258. 
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3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Wendy Sullivan did not act surreptitiously 
or wrongfully by taking the parties' children from Illinois and in not declining jurisdiction by 
reason of her conduct? 
Standard of Review: Issues which involve application of statutory law to the facts 
present mixed questions of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, giving the trial court some discretion in applying 
the law to the facts. State Ex. Rel G.B., 2002 UT App 270, 53 P.3d 963, 966. 
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, Interior 8 and 9; Record p. 256 and 257. 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. Rules 41(a)(2)(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UUCCJEA), §§78-
45c-102(7), 110, 201(l)(a) through (d), 110, 206(l)(a), 208 and 209; Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (IUCCJA), Illinois Revised Statutes, 750-5/601, et seq., and 
850-35/1, efttty 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married in August, 1995 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and have a son, 
Brett, born on April 2, 1996, and a daughter, Sydney, born July 18, 1997. The parties moved to 
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Illinois in December, 1999 and were living in Thompsonville, Illinois, in June, 2002. On or 
about June 26, 2002, Wendy Sullivan took the children with her to Utah to visit her family, and 
according to Mark notified him on July 2, 2002 that she was not returning to Illinois and intended 
to terminate the parties marriage. She filed in Utah her First Complaint for divorce on 
September 26, 2002. Mark Sullivan was served with the First Complaint on or about November 
27, 2002, and filed an Answer on December 27, 2002, contesting the Utah court's jurisdiction 
and asserting that Illinois had jurisdiction as the home state pursuant to the UCCJEA, since the 
children had lived in Illinois for more than six months before Wendy Sullivan left the state. 
Wendy Sullivan filed her Second Complaint in Utah on January 28, 2003, claiming that she had 
been in Utah for six months and that Utah now qualified as the home state. Mark Sullivan was 
personally served the Second Complaint on March 19, 2003. Mark Sullivan thereafter filed a 
custody proceeding in Illinois on April 7, 2003. When Mark Sullivan moved to consolidate the 
two divorce proceedings under the earlier filed case, Wendy Sullivan objected and moved to 
dismiss her First Complaint. The Utah trial court mistakenly dismissed the Wendy Sullivan's 
First Complaint on May 15, 2003 before the briefing time had elapsed. Following a hearing, 
however, the Court allowed the dismissal to stand, found that Mark Sullivan had waited too long 
to file his complaint in Illinois, and found the Utah had jurisdiction over the matter. Mark 
Sullivan appeals from the dismissal of Wendy Sullivan's First Complaint and the trial court's 
holding that Utah had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on August 26, 1995, in New Mexico, and have two minor 
children, Brett Sullivan, age 8, and Sydney Sullivan, age 6. The parties and their minor children 
resided in Illinois between December 1999 and June 2002. Record, pp. 201 and 202, paragraphs 
2 and 5. 
2. In June, 2002, Wendy Sullivan left Illinois with the children to visit family in Utah. 
On July 2, 2002, Wendy notified Mark she was not returning to Illinois and intended to terminate 
the parties marriage. Record at 186 pg. 5; Illinois Rule 23 Order p.l. 
3. Wendy Sullivan filed her First Complaint for divorce in the Second District Court, 
Farmington Department, on September 26, 2002, Civil No. 024701693DA. Record, p. 201-212. 
4. Mark Sullivan was served with the First Complaint in Illinois on November 27, 2002. 
Record, p. 222. He filed an Answer on December 27, 2002 (hereinafter the "First Answer") 
disputing the Utah court's jurisdiction and requesting that all proceedings relating to custody of 
the minor children be referred to the Circuit Court of Hamilton County, Illinois, McLeansboro, 
Illinois, Record, p. 223-226. 
5. Wendy Sullivan filed her Second Complaint in Utah on January 28, 2003, Civil No. 
034700173. Record, pp. 1-5. The Second Complaint was served on Mark Sullivan , March 19, 
2003. Record, p.9. 
6. Mark Sullivan filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003, in the Second 
Judicial Circuit Court for Hamilton County, Illinois, case number 03-F-5. Record, pp. 112-116; 
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pp. 245-252. 
7. Mark Sullivan filed an Answer to the Petitioner's Second Complaint on April 22, 
2003 (hereinafter "the Second Answer"). Record, pp. 117-120. At the same time, he also filed a 
Motion to Consolidate the two divorce actions under the earlier-filed civil number pursuant to 
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-107 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration (now part of Rule 42), or in the alternative dismiss the later-filed complaint. 
Record, pp. 232-233. 
8. On or about April 29, 2003, Wendy Sullivan filed a motion to dismiss the First 
Complaint and her objection to Mark Sullivan's motion to consolidate. Record, pp 234-237. 
9. On or about May 2, 2003, Wendy Sullivan filed an Answer to Mark's Petition for 
Child Custody in Hamilton County, Illinois, case number 03-F-5. Record, P. 194. 
10. On May 15, 2003, the Utah trial court prematurely entered an order dismissing 
Wendy Sullivan's First Complaint (hereinafter "the Dismissal Order"). Record, p. 253. The trial 
court later concluded that the Dismissal Order was untimely. See Amended Order Denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint (hereinafter "the 
Amended Order of Denial"). Record, p. 146, paragraph 3. 
11. On May 28, 2003, Mark Sullivan filed a motion to set aside the Dismissal Order with 
a supporting memorandum. Record,. Pp. 259-267. 
12. A hearing was held on August 7, 2003, before the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen on 
Mark Sullivan's motion to set aside the Dismissal Order and motion to consolidate Wendy 
-5-
Sullivan's two divorce cases. Record, p. 273 and p. 188 (transcript). At the conclusion of the 
hearing, Judge Hansen declined to set aside the Dismissal Order because he found that Mark 
Sullivan had not filed a custody proceeding in Illinois within six months of Wendy Sullivan 
leaving Illinois. Judge Hansen concluded that the Utah court had jurisdiction of the custody 
issues relating to the parties' minor children. Record, page 146, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3; Record p. 
188, interior page 19. 
13. The Utah court entered its Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order 
Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint on September 22, 2003, Record, p. 277. Mark Sullivan's 
Notice of Appeal was filed on October 22, 2003, Record, p. 148. An Amended Order Denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint was entered on 
October 28, 2003. Record, p. 145. 
14. On December 30, 2003, Mark Sullivan filed an Emergency Petition for Temporary 
Child Custody in Hamilton County, Illinois. Record, p. 163. On December 31, 2003, the Illinois 
court, Honorable Barry L. Vaughan presiding, issued an Order for Temporary Child Custody 
finding that Illinois was the home state of the parties' minor children at the commencement of 
Wendy Sullivan's divorce action filed September 26, 2002 and that the Utah court had erred in 
not staying its proceeding. The Illinois court awarded Mark Sullivan temporary custody pending 
further proceedings. Record, pp. 170 and 171. The Illinois court entered a preliminary injunction 
on January 5, 2004 but changed its position after a telephone conference with Judge Hansen on 
January 8, 2004, and entered an order vacating the preliminary injunction. Record, p.p. 172-174. 
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15. Certain Illinois court documents are not part of the Utah court file but may be 
important for the Court to consider in this action and are therefore filed with the Addendum to 
this Brief. They include the Rule 23 Order of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, 
entered on May 21, 2004, affirming Judge Vaughan's order setting aside the preliminary 
injunction. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the Illinois action was effectively stayed 
pending this Court's decision on Mark Sullivan's appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly dismissed Wendy Sullivan's First Complaint and allowed her to 
proceed with her Second Complaint. Wendy Sullivan's Second Complaint alleges additional 
claims against Mark Sullivan in that Utah is now the home state of the children and Mark failed 
to file a child custody proceeding in Illinois. 
Mark Sullivan failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois to determine the 
custody of the children by not filing a child custody proceeding within six (6) months of the 
children moving to Utah in June, 2002. 
By the time Mark Sullivan finally filed for custody in the State of Illinois on April 7, 
2003, he knew (a) it had been more than six months since his wife had notified him of her intent 
to remain in Utah; (b) the children had been living with his wife in the State of Utah in excess of 
six months; and (c) more importantly, that a proceeding for child custody was pending in the 
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State of Utah. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-45c-206(l) as well as UCCJEA adopted by the State of 
Illinois, precludes Illinois from exercising jurisdiction because at the time of the commencement 
of the Illinois proceeding filed on April 7, 2003, a proceeding concerning custody of the children 
had been previously filed on January 28, 2003 in the State of Utah in a court having jurisdiction 
substantially in conformity with the UCCJEA and because Utah was the home state of the 
children. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DISMISSING WENDY SULLIVAN'S FIRST 
COMPLAINT AND IN ALLOWING HER TO 
PROCEED WITH HER SECOND COMPLAINT 
Wendy Sullivan filed her First Complaint for divorce and for custody of the children in 
Utah on September 26, 2002. Under the First Complaint it is clear Utah did not have jurisdiction 
to determine custody under the UCCJEA because the children had not resided in the state of Utah 
for at least six (6) months prior to the commencement of the action. §78-45c-201(l) U.C.A. 
On the other hand, it is clear under the Second Complaint Utah does have jurisdiction to 
determine custody. Under the UCCJEA, Utah has become the home state of the children. 
Wendy, in her Second Complaint, alleged Utah was the home state of the children and that no 
child custody proceedings had been filed in Illinois, Record at pg. 2. 
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Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Wendy Sullivan, moved the 
trial court to dismiss her First Complaint. Record, p. 236. Mark Sullivan had filed an Answer 
but no counterclaim. Record, p. 223. In his Answer filed December 27, 2002, Mark asked the 
First Complaint be dismissed and that all custody proceedings be referred to Illinois. However, 
by December 27, 2002, Mark had not filed any child custody proceeding in Illinois permitting an 
Illinois court to invoke jurisdiction. The trial court granted Wendy Sullivan's motion to dismiss 
her First Complaint as Mark Sullivan had only answered and had not filed a counterclaim. 
Wendy Sullivan's Second Complaint alleges additional claims against Mark Sullivan not 
found in the First Complaint as more than six months had elapsed since the children had resided 
in Utah with their mother and Mark had failed to file a child custody proceeding in Illinois. 
Under Mark's interpretation of the UCCJEA, Wendy would be forever time barred from 
filing for custody in Utah because her First Complaint was filed within six months of relocating 
to Utah with the children. Because more than six months had elapsed since Wendy moved to 
Utah and Mark had failed to invoke the jurisdiction of Illinois Wendy was entitled to file a 
Second Complaint to assert additional rights given to her under the UCCJEA. However, Mark 
should only be given six months from when Wendy and the children moved to Utah to protect his 
rights under the UCCJEA. 
A. UTAH HAS JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJEA. 
Utah is the proper state to assert jurisdiction concerning custody of the children in this 
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case pursuant to §78-45c-206(l) U.C.A. Illinois should be prohibited from exercising 
jurisdiction concerning custody because a child custody proceeding had already been commenced 
by Wendy Sullivan on January 28, 2003 after the children had resided with her for more than six 
months in the State of Utah. Mark filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003 in Illinois 
and referred only to the First Complaint filed by Wendy on September 26, 2002 and failed to 
advise the Illinois Court of the Second Complaint filed on January 28, 2003 contrary to the 
requirements of §78-45c-209(l). Specifically Mark failed to advise the Illinois Court in his 
Petition filed on April 7, 2003 of Wendy's Second Complaint filed on January 28, 2003 and that 
Mark had been served with the Second Complaint on March 19, 2003. Record, p. 112. This 
important fact was clarified with the Illinois Court during the telephone conference between 
Judge Hansen and Judge Vaughn on January 8, 2004. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-45c-206 concerned with simultaneous proceedings, states: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in §78-45c-204, a court 
of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this 
chapter if at the time of the commencement of the 
proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the 
child had been previously commenced in a court of 
another state having jurisdiction substantially in con-
formity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has 
been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other 
state because a court of this state is a more convenient 
forum under §78-45c-207. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in §78-45c-204, a court of 
this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding shall 
examine the court documents and other information supplied 
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by the parties pursuant to §78-45c-209. If the court determines 
that a child custody proceeding was previously commenced in a 
court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance 
with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding 
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court 
of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with 
this chapter does not determine that the court of this state is a 
more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the 
proceeding. 
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a 
court of this state shall determine whether a proceeding to 
enforce the determination has been commenced in another 
state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination 
has been commenced in another state, the court may: 
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the 
entry of an order of a court of the other state 
enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the 
proceeding for enforcement; 
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding 
for enforcement; or 
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it 
considers appropriate; 
Wendy having filed a child custody proceeding in Utah on January 28, 2003 after residing 
in Utah with the children for more than six months and serving Mark with the Second Complaint 
before he filed in Illinois should prevent the State of Illinois from exercising jurisdiction pursuant 
to§206oftheUCCJEA. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED NOT TO CONSOLIDATE 
THE TWO DIVORCE CASES AND DISMISSED THE INITIAL CASE. 
The trial court correctly ruled it would not consolidate the two cases and properly granted 
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Ms. Sullivan's Motion to Dismiss her First Complaint. The First and Second Complaint should 
not be consolidated because they involve a different interpretation and application of the 
UCCJEA. 
Under the First Complaint, Utah would not have jurisdiction to determine custody as it 
was not the home state of the children. However, it is clear under the Second Complaint, Utah 
has jurisdiction to determine custody as it has become the home state of the children and also 
because Mark Sullivan had failed to file in Illinois invoking the jurisdiction of the Illinois Court. 
Mark argues for consolidation of the two cases but cites no authority prohibiting Wendy 
Sullivan from filing a second proceeding in Utah especially when by the lapse of time Wendy 
acquires greater rights under the UCCJEA. Consolidation is not a proper remedy if it violates 
statutory provisions or would be prejudicial to a party. See Raggenbuck vs. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 
327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958). In this case consolidating the two cases would violate statutory 
interpretation of the UCCJEA and be prejudicial to Wendy Sullivan regarding which state has 
jurisdiction to determine custody as between the filing of the First Complaint and the Second 
Complaint. Consolidation would be improper and prejudicial to Wendy Sullivan because there is 
a distinct difference in application of the UCCJEA in determining jurisdiction. Severance is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court and absence abuse of such discretion will not be 
upset on appeal. King vs. Barron. 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988). 
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II MARK SULLIVAN DID NOT FILE HIS 
CUSTODY ACTION IN A TIMELY MANNER 
Mark Sullivan filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003 in Hamilton County, 
Illinois. Mark was served on March 19, 2003 with Wendy's Second Complaint. It is submitted 
that Mark only filed his action for custody on April 7, 2003 as he knew Utah would undoubtedly 
assume jurisdiction to determine custody unless he filed an action in the State of Illinois. Mark 
had demonstrated no interest in obtaining custody of the children until he was forced to choose 
between relinquishing custody or filing for custody in Illinois. It is further submitted Mark had 
failed to support his children in any respect after they moved to Utah and was content to maintain 
the status quo until he was served with the Second Complaint. 
In this case, Mark forfeited any right he may have had under the UCCJEA that the State 
of Illinois be considered to have exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody of the children. Utah 
became the home state of the children on December 26, 2002, six months after Wendy moved to 
Utah because Mark failed to file a child custody proceeding in Illinois. 
Was Mark prejudiced by Wendy filing a Second Complaint and moving to dismiss her 
First Complaint? No, just the opposite. The initial filing by Wendy gave notice to Mark of her 
intent to obtain a divorce and that she was seeking custody of the children. It gave Mark notice 
that he should do what he knew he must do if he wanted custody of his children; i.e., file for 
custody in Illinois before the six month period lapsed. Mark was not precluded from filing in 
Illinois after he was served with the First Complaint but he chose not to exercise his remedies 
under the UCCJEA adopted in Utah and Illinois. 
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A. MARK SULLIVAN'S DELAY IN FILING IN ILLINOIS 
CONFERS JURISDICTION UPON UTAH. 
Mark's filing his Petition for Child Custody in Illinois on April 7, 2004 is untimely under 
§78-45c-206(l) concerned with simultaneous proceedings in different states. Illinois should be 
prohibited from exercising jurisdiction as there was a child custody proceeding already filed by 
Wendy in Utah on January 28, 2003. 
In Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 70 P.3rd 58, 68 (Utah 2003), a North Carolina 
father challenged the adoption of his son in adoption proceedings held in Utah. In this case, 
Supreme Court Justice Christine Durham discussed the UCCJEA and especially §78-45c-206 as 
to conflicts between North Carolina and Utah over the adoption proceeding. 
Citing §78-45c-201(l) Justice Durham stated, 
The UCCJEA gives a Utah Court jurisdiction to make 
an initial child custody determination only if (1) Utah 
is the child's home state on the date the proceeding begins, 
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction or is 
not a more appropriate forum, (3) all other courts that might 
have jurisdiction under the proceeding provision have declined 
to exercise it, or (4) no state would otherwise have jurisdiction. 
As to simultaneous proceedings involving child custody proceedings, Justice Durham 
elaborated: 
The UCCJEA has a provision that explicitly governs a 
situation where two courts in different states have initiated 
potentially conflicting proceedings regarding a birth parent's 
parental rights and the custody of a child. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45c-206. See 70 P.3rd at 69. 
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In this case, Utah is the appropriate state to exercise child custody jurisdiction because (1) 
Utah is the home state of the children; (2) Illinois is no longer the home state because Mark 
Sullivan failed to file a child custody proceeding with six months of the children moving to Utah; 
(3) the children and Wendy Sullivan have a significant connection with the State of Utah; (4) 
there is substantial evidence in the state of Utah concerning the children's care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships; (5) Illinois has not asserted jurisdiction because of 
inconvenient forum or because of unjustifiable conduct; and (6) Wendy was the first to file after 
Utah became the home state. 
Similarly in Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087, (Maryland 2000) the Maryland Court of 
Appeals held if a child custody proceeding is pending in another jurisdiction, a Maryland Court 
must usually decline to exercise its jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 
B. WENDY SULLIVAN'S ABSENCE FROM ILLINOIS SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN CALCULATING THE SIX 
MONTH PERIOD OF RESIDENCE. 
Mark claims Wendy told him repeatedly that she was only visiting Utah temporarily and 
that she was planning to return with the children to Illinois. However, that allegation is not 
supported by reference to any reliable record. Mark's Statement of Facts refers to allegations set 
forth in his Answer, not to any sworn testimony. The only other reference cited by Mark was 
during proffer to the trial court at the August 7, 2003 hearing. 
It should be noted that on page 1 of the Illinois Rule 23 Order, attached as an Addendum 
to Mark's brief, the Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District recited that in June, 2002 Wendy 
took the children to Utah to visit her family, and according to Mark, she notified him on July 2, 
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2002 that she was not returning to Illinois, and intended to terminate the parties' marriage. 
The record should reflect on August 7, 2003, hearing before District Judge Darwin C. 
Hansen, R at 188, p. 13, and found on interior page 13, Wendy's counsel offered to have Wendy 
sworn and testify under what circumstances she left the state of Illinois, and about communica-
tion between she and Mark. Mark's counsel declined to have her testify even though Judge 
Hansen ruled he would leave it up to Mark's counsel to have her testify. 
III. WENDY SULLIVAN DID NOT TAKE THE CHILDREN 
FROM ILLINOIS UNDER FALSE PRETENSES. 
One again, this issue raised by Mark should be stricken as Mark claims Wendy repeatedly 
represented to him she would be returning with the children to Illinois but there is no reference to 
any reliable record as to that alleged fact. Mark's Answer does not constitute a reliable record to 
support his self serving position. 
At the hearing of August 7, 2003 before District Court Judge, Darwin C. Hansen, Record 
at 188, p. 5-6, Judge Hansen asked Mark's counsel when did Wendy advise Mark she was going 
to stay in Utah and not go back to Illinois. Mark's attorney responded "sometime in July", (pg. 
5,6). 
This response by Mark's counsel is consistent with the Illinois Rule 23 Order stating 
Wendy told Mark on July 2 that she was not returning to Illinois and intended to terminate the 
marriage. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wendy Sullivan's filing of her Second Complaint for divorce and custody was 
appropriate considering the First Complaint was dismissed by the trial court and because Utah 
became the home state of the children permitting it to exercise jurisdiction over custody of the 
children. Utah, not Illinois, is the home state of the children and the correct state to exercise 
jurisdiction over custody pursuant to §78-45c-206 U.C.A. as there was commenced in Utah a 
child custody proceeding before one was filed in the state of Illinois. The Court should not 
consider Mark Sullivan's claim that Wendy Sullivan's absence from Illinois was temporary or 
she left Illinois under false pretenses as not supported by a reliable record. 
DATED this J ^4ay of August, 2004. 
ROBERT L. NEELEY J 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY SULLIVAN, 
Petitioner/Appellee ) CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
vs. 
MARK ALLEN SULLIVAN, 
Respondent/ Appellant 
) Appellate Case No. 20030957-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
JUDGE DARWIN C. HANSEN 
I, Robert L. Neeley, certify that on August / ^ _
 r2004,1 served two copies of the attached 
Brief of Appellee by mailing to Thomas R. King, Attorney at Law, 648 East 100 South, Suite 
200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 by first class mail. 
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ADDENDUM 
vi 
807 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 44 
Rule 40. Ass ignment of cases for trial; cont inuance . 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide 
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) 
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party 
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as 
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the 
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such post-
ponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence 
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of 
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show tha t due 
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also 
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon 
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and 
if the adverse party thereupon admits tha t such evidence 
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the 
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postpone-
ment, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present 
taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the testimony 
so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and 
subject to the same objections tha t may be made with respect 
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and 
(B). 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of 
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be 
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a 
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse 
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permit-
ted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of 
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or 
including the same claim. 
(a)(2) By order of court Unless the plaintiff timely files a 
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of 
this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the 
plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have ap-
peared in the action; or 
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant 
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defen-
dant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending 
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is 
without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
move for a dismissal on the ground tha t upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in 
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under 
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of 
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction 
of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who 
has once dismissed an action in any court commences an 
action based upon or including the same claim against the 
same defendant, the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may 
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until 
the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. 
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) 
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, 
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the 
adverse par ty against whom such provisional remedy was 
obtained. 
Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common ques-
tion of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a 
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the 
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may 
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend 
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience 
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any 
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, 
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. 
Rule 43. Evidence . 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be 
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these 
rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. All 
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts 
not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on 
affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court 
may direct t h a t the mat ter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony or depositions. 
Rule 44. Proof of official record. 
(a) Authentication of copy. An official record or an entry 
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced 
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the 
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, 
and in the absence of judicial knowledge or competent evi-
dence, accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the 
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is within the 
United States or within a territory or insular possession 
subject to the dominion of the United States, the certificate 
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ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping 
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1. Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to §§ 1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(l), 72 
modify foreign child custody decree under A.L.R.5th 249. 
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Cus- Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child 
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Paren- custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform 
tal Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 
A.L.R.5th 1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185. ' 
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify Appealability of interlocutory or pendente 
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1) lite order for temporary child custody, 82 
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris- A.L.R.5th 389. 
78-45c-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and nec-
essary care or supervision. 
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married. 
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other 
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or 
parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, 
temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an 
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individ-
ual. 
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal 
custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue. 
The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, 
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and 
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The 
term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, con-
tractual emancipation, or enforcement under Part 3, Enforcement. 
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceed-
ing. 
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to 
establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination. 
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or 
a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immedi-
ately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case 
of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which 
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of 
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. 
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination 
concerning a particular child. 
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody deter-
mination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter. 
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determi-
nation is made. 
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that changes, 
replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination 
concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that 
made the previous determination. 
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision, agency, 
or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
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(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, 
who: 
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for 
a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, 
within one year immediately before the commencement of a child 
custody proceeding; and 
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to 
legal custody under the law of this state. 
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a 
child. 
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or 
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village 
which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state. 
(17) 'Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing 
law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-102, enacted by ent-time" for 'Visitation" in Subsections (3) and 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 2; 2001, ch. 255, § 36. (4). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par- § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Custody proceeding. not custody issue under this chapter. T.B. v. 
Voluntary termination of adoptive father's M.M.J., 908 R2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
parental rights in, and obligations to, child was 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or de- Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
terminations are governed by the Uniform 78 A.L.R.4th 1028. 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCC JA) or the 
78-45c-103. Proceedings governed by other law. 
This chapter does not govern: 
(1) an adoption proceeding; or 
(2) a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical 
care for a child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-103, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-104. Application to Indian tribes. 
(1) A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., is not subject to this 
chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
(2) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as a state of the United States for 
purposes of Part 1, General Provisions, and Part 2, Jurisdiction. 
(3) A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circum-
stances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this 
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shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may 
be by publication if other means are not effective. 
(2) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this 
state or by the law of the state in which the service is made. 
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a 
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-108, enacted by § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 8. Cross-References. — Service of process, 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, Rule 4, U.R.C.P. 
78-45c-109. Appearance and limited immunity. 
(1) A party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in this state and is a responding party under Part 2, Jurisdiction, 
a party in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination under Part 2, 
Jurisdiction, or a petitioner in a proceeding to enforce or register a child 
custody determination under Part 3, Enforcement, may appear and participate 
in the proceeding without submitting to personal jurisdiction over the party for 
another proceeding or purpose. 
(2) A party is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state solely by being 
physically present for the purpose of participating in a proceeding under this 
chapter. If a party is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis 
other than physical presence, the party may be served with process in this 
state. If a party present in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of another 
state, service of process allowable under the laws of that state may be 
accomplished in this state. 
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation 
based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this chapter 
committed by an individual while present in this state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-109, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L< 2000, ch. 247, § 9. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-110. Communication between courts. 
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state 
concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter. 
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If 
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall 
be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision 
on jurisdiction is made. 
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, 
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need 
not be made of that communication. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the 
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication 
and granted access to the record. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is 
inscribed on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or 
transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the 
courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an 
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electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum 
or an electronic record made by a court after the communication. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-110, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 10. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-lll. Taking testimony in another state. 
(1) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child 
custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in 
another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or 
other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The 
court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in 
another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon 
which the testimony is taken. 
(2) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state 
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic 
means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of 
this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an 
appropriate location for the deposition or testimony. 
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this 
state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not 
be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-lll, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 11. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-112. Cooperation between courts — Preservation 
of records, 
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state 
to: 
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing; 
(b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that 
state; 
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a 
child involved in a pending proceeding; 
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of 
the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any 
evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and 
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having 
physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without 
the child. 
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may: 
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1); or 
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a 
custody proceeding in another state. 
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request under 
Subsection (2)(b) upon assurance by the other state that travel and other 
necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has 
physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it 
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appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest 
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state. 
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under 
Subsections (1) and (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the 
law of this state. 
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records 
of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child 
custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate 
request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall 
forward a certified copy of these records. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-112, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 12. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
PART 2 
JURISDICTION 
78-45c-201. Initial child custody jurisdiction. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c~204, a court of this state 
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: 
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child 
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent 
continues to live in this state; 
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection 
(l)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum 
under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; and 
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one 
parent or a person acting as a parent have a significant connection 
with this state other than mere physical presence; and 
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the 
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; 
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a) or (b) have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is 
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under 
Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; or 
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child 
custody determination by a court of this state. 
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody determination. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-201, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 13. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
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(3) The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a 
child custody proceeding under this chapter are governed by the law of this 
state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-205, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 17. § 42
 m a kes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-206. Simultaneous proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state 
may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the 
commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the 
child had been previously commenced in a court of another state having 
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceed-
ing has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a 
court of this state is a more convenient forum under Section 78-45c-207. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state, 
before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents 
and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 78-45c-209. 
If the court determines that a child custody proceeding was previously 
commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in 
accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding 
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state 
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter does not 
determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of 
this state shall dismiss the proceeding. 
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this 
state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has 
been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody 
determination has been commenced in another state, the court may: 
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of 
a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the 
proceeding for enforcement; 
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforce-
ment; or 
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appro-
priate. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-206, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
U 2000, ch. 247, § 18. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exercise of jurisdiction. 
—Hearing. 
Pending foreign proceeding. 
—Stay of Utah action. 
Proceedings elsewhere. 
—Due process. 
Exercise of jurisdiction. 
—Hearing. 
When a mother and child living in Utah 
sought relief in Utah from an Ohio custody 
order being enforced in Utah by her husband, 
the district court erred in refusing to hold a 
hearing to examine whether, under §§ 78-45c-
851 
78-45c-207 JUDICIAL CODE 
14 and 78-45c-6, jurisdiction should be exer-
cised by the Utah court. Given the policy con-
siderations behind this chapter, the district 
court, at the very least, should have stayed its 
determination until after it held a hearing to 
determine whether jurisdiction should have 
been exercised. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
P e n d i n g foreign proceeding. 
—Stay of Utah action. 
Utah district court, after learning of prior 
guardianship proceedings in Oregon, was re-
quired to stay a Utah action seeking to deter-
mine child custody and to communicate with 
the Oregon court to determine the propriety of 
further proceedings in Oregon, so that the 
issues could be litigated in the more appropri-
ate forum, where the child resided in Oregon at 
the time and the Oregon court had appointed 
the child's grandparents as guardians. Cop-
pedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985). 
Proceedings e l sewhere . 
Where grandparents in Oregon, with whom 
child was visiting, had won custody in Oregon 
court, Utah district court was required to stay 
parents ' proceeding seeking custody determina-
tion and to communicate with Oregon court to 
determine the propriety of further proceedings 
in Oregon. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P. 2d 1121 
(Utah 1985). 
—Due process . 
A mother was denied her due process rights 
by the trial court's enforcement of a foreign-
custody modification judgment which had ques-
tionable jurisdictional validity without giving 
the mother reasonable notice and opportunity 
to be heard. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or de-
terminations are governed by the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
78 A.L.R.4th 1028. 
Default jurisdiction of court under § (a)(4) of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A (c)(2)(D), 6 
A.L.R.5th 69. 
Pending proceeding in another state as 
ground for declining jurisdiction under § 6(a) of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(g), 20 
A.L.R.5th 700. 
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to 
modify foreign child custody decree under 
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Paren-
tal Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67 
A.L.R.5th 1. 
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify 
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1) 
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(l), 72 A.L.R.5th 
249. 
Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child 
custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185. 
78-45c-207. Inconvenient forum. 
(1) A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a 
child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time 
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and 
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of 
inconvenient forum may be raised upon the court's own motion, request of 
another court, or motion of a party. 
(2) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this 
state shall consider whether it is appropriate that a court of another state 
exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to 
submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including: 
(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in 
the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; 
(b) the length of time the child has resided outside this state; 
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(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state 
that would assume jurisdiction; 
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; 
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume 
jurisdiction; 
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the 
pending litigation, including the testimony of the child; 
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously 
and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and 
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of 
the pending litigation. 
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and 
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the 
proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly 
commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition 
the court considers just and proper. 
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this 
chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or 
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other 
proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-207, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 19. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204 or by other law of 
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a 
person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the 
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless: 
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the 
exercise of jurisdiction; 
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 
78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203 determines that this state is a more 
appropriate forum under Section 78-45c-207; or 
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 
through 78-45c-203. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to 
Subsection (1), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of 
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying 
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. 
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines 
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1), it shall charge the party 
invoking the jurisdiction of the court with necessary and reasonable expenses 
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees, 
expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the 
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the 
award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or 
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this 
chapter. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-45c-208, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 20. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. ' 
78-45e-209. Information to be submitted to court. 
(1) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an 
attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under 
oath as to the child's present address, the places where the child has lived 
during the last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons 
with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit 
shall state whether the party: 
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in 
any other proceeding concerning the custody of or parent-time with the 
child and, if so, identify the court, the case number of the proceeding, and 
the date of the child custody determination, if any; 
(b) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, 
including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domes-
tic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adop-
tions and, if so, identify the court and the case number and the nature of 
the proceeding; and 
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the 
proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal 
custody or physical custody of, or parent-time with, the child and, if so, the 
names and addresses of those persons. 
(2) If the information required by Subsection (1) is not furnished, the court, 
upon its own motion or that of a party, may stay the proceeding until the 
information is furnished. 
(3) If the declaration as to any of the items described in Subsection (1) is in 
the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as 
required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to 
details of the information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's 
jurisdiction and the disposition of the case. 
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding 
in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding. 
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, 
safety, or liberty of a party or child would be put at risk by the disclosure of 
identifying information, that information shall be sealed and not disclosed to 
the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made 
after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety, 
or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the 
interest of justice. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-209, enacted by exit-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (l)(a) 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 21; 2001, ch. 255, § 37. and (c). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par- § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-210. Appearance of parties and child. 
(1) A court of this state may order a party to a child custody proceeding who 
is in this state to appear before the court personally with or without the child. 
The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physical 
custody or control of the child to appear physically with the child. 
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Petitioner, Mark Sullivan, appeals the denial of his motion to reconsider the order 
entered by the circuit court of Hamilton County setting aside a preliminary injunction that 
gave him temporary custody of the parties' children. The appeal is pursuant to Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 111. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). We affirm. 
Mark Sullivan and Wendy Sullivan, respondent, were married on August 26, 1995, 
in Albuquerque, New Mexico. During the course of their marriage, two children were born 
of the parties, namely: Brett Vernon Sullivan, bom April 2,1996, and Sydney June Sullivan, 
bom July 18, 1997. The parties became residents of Illinois in December 1999 and resided 
in West Frankfort, Franklin County, Illinois. In June 2001, they moved to Thompsonville, 
Hamilton County, Illinois. In June 2002, Wendy took the children to Utah to visit her 
family, and according to Mark, she notified him on July 2 that she was not returning to 
Illinois and intended to terminate the parties' marriage. 
On September 26, 2002, Wendy filed in Utah a complaint for the dissolution of the 
parties' marriage and for the custody of the children. On December 26,2002, Mark entered 
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his appearance and moved to dismiss the Utah proceedings. On January 28, 2003, Wendy 
opened a new file in Utah and? for a second time, filed for the dissolution of the parties' 
marriage and for the custody of the children On April 7, 2003, Mark filed a petition for the 
custody of the children in Hamilton County, Illinois, and on April 22, he filed an answer and 
objection to jurisdiction in the second dissolution proceeding initiated by Wendy in Utah. 
On May 5, 2003, Wendy entered her pro se appearance in the Illinois action filed by Mark. 
Wendy also filed an answer in which she stated that she had previously filed a complaint for 
the dissolution of the marriage and for the custody of the children in Davis County, Utah, in 
January 2003. On May 15,2003, Utah judge Honorable Darwin C.Hansen granted Wendy's 
motion to dismiss her original complaint. On August 7, 2003, Judge Hansen denied Mark's 
request to reinstate Wendy's original complaint and to consolidate it with her second 
complaint for dissolution. Judge Hansen also found that Utah had jurisdiction to decide the 
dissolution and custody issues presented and referred the case to a commissioner for further 
proceedings. Judge Hansen's decision determining that Utahhad jurisdiction over this matter 
is currently pending before the Utah Court of Appeals (Sullivan v. Sullivan, No. 20030957 
(docketed November 26, 2003)). 
On November 13, 2003, a hearing was conducted before Commissioner David S. 
DiJlion pertaining to the custody of the parties' children, child support, and visitation. 
Wendy was present and was represented by counsel. Mark was not present but was 
represented by counsel. On December 5, 2003, the Utah court entered an order granting 
Wendy temporary custody of the minor children and granting Mark visitation during the 
Christmas season, Mark exercised his right to visitation pursuant to the Utah order and 
returned the children to Illinois. While the children were still in Illinois, Mark filed an ex 
parte emergency petition for temporary custody in the State of Illinois. Judge Barry 
Vaughan found that Utah's temporary custody order was not entitled to full faith and credit, 
2 
because Utah did not have proper jurisdiction over the child custody issue in the case. As 
a result, the court granted the ex parte request and scheduled the hearing on the preliminary 
injunction for January 5,2004. On Januaiy 2,2004, Wendy was served with the petition and 
a notice of the hearing. On Januaiy 5,2004, Wendy was found in default, and a preliminary 
injunction was entered granting Mark temporary custody of the children. 
On Januaiy 8, 2004, counsel in Utah for Wendy and Mark arranged for a telephone 
conference between Judge Hansen and Judge Vaughan pursuant to section 7(c) of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Act): 
"If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding 
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court 
assumed jurisdiction^] it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court 
in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in 
the more appropriate forum and that infonnation be exchanged in accordance with 
Sections 20 through 23 of this Act. If a court of this State has made a custody 
judgment before being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another statefj 
it shdl immediately inform that court of the fact If the court is informed that a 
proceeding was commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction^] it shall 
likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the most 
appropriate forum." 750 LLCS 35/7(c) (West 2002).l 
lThc Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has since been repealed and replaced, 
effective January 1,2004, by the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(Pub. Act 93-108, art. 1, §§101,404, efif. January 1, 2004 (repealing 750ILCS 35/1 elseg. 
and adding 750 ILCS 361101 at seq.)). Motions or other requests for relief made in child-
custody proceedings or to enforce child-custody determinations that had been commenced 
before the effective date of the new act are governed by the law in effect at the time the 
3 
After the telephone conference, Judge Vaughan made the following entry in the case 
record sheet: 
"Court receives telephone call @ 4:30 p.m. from Judge Darwin C. Hanson [sic], 2* 
Judicial District, Utah; a record of the proceedings was made by Judge Hansen; judges 
discuss jurisdictional issues & fact of two contrary terapforary] cust[ody] orders; 
teleconference per 75 [sic] ILCS 35/§§ 7 & 8; judges agree that Illinois court will stay 
per § 7 its proceedings pending decision from Utah Appellate Court. Preliminary 
injunction entered granting temporary custody to father is vacated effective 1-12-04 
at noon per § 7(c). In staying these proceedings, the IL & UT courts agree that the 
appeal pending in Utah is controlling; the IL court is not declining jurisdiction nor [sic] 
conceding jurisdiction but deferring to the Utah Appellate Court; there is no question 
Utah has jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings; Utah had a temporary custody 
order in place at the time the IL temporary] custody was entered; the court is also 
troubled by [the] fact Mark f(]husband[)] did not file a custody action in IL until 4-7-
03, 9 months after wife left, 6 months after wife filed proceedings in Utah, & 4 
month[sJ after husband filed an answer in Utah; had husband filed custody in IL 
sooner, there is no question IL would be the home state; at this point in the 
proceedings Judge Vaughan & Judge Hansen agree this is a matter best left to the Utah 
court of appeals." 
The Act was adopted in both Illinois and Utah. 750 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2002); 
Utah Code Ann, §78-45c-101 et seq. (2002). The Act seeks to avoid jurisdictional 
competitions and conflicts between states, to protect children's best interests, and to 
discourage forum shopping. In re Marriage ofRizza, 231 [11. App. 3d 83, 87, 603 N.E.2d 
134, 138 (1992). Accordingly, the Act achieves certainty by providing that the first state to 
motions or other requests were made. 
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exercise jurisdiction has the exclusive right to proceed. In re Marriage o/Kneitz, 341 111. 
App. 3d 299,304,793 N.E.2d 988,993 (2003); see also In re Marriage ofludwinski, 329 111. 
App. 3d 1149, 1154, 769 N.E 2d 1094, 1099 (2002). Specifically, section 7(a) of the Act 
provides as follows: 
"A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if at the time of 
filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a 
court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act, 
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this State is a 
more appropriate forum or for other reasons." 750ILCS 35/7(a) (West 2002). 
Similarly, section 14 states: 
"The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification 
judgment of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory 
provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual 
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as this judgment 
has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar 
to those of this Act." 750 ILCS 35/14 (West 2002). 
Before resolving this matter, it is important to identify what is and what is not before 
the court. The limited issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court enred in dissolving 
the preliminary injunction it had previously entered. Controverted facts or the merits of the 
case are not decided where, as hcrcf an interlocutory appeal is brought pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 III. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). Yates v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 193 HI. 
App. 3d 431, 437, 549 N.E.2d 1010, 1014 (1990). The only issue in such an appeal is 
"whether there was a sufficient showing to sustain the order of the trial court granting or 
denying the relief sought" Yates, 193 111. App. 3d at 437, 549 N,E.2d at 1014; see also 
Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 111. App. 3d 959, 962, 614 N.E.2d 1312, 1315-16 
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(1993). 
Mark frames the issue as follows: "Whether the Illinois circuit court erred in deferring 
subject matter jurisdiction to the.State of Utah?" The court did not decline subject matter 
jurisdiction in the case. If it had, Mark's petition would have been dismissed. The court 
specifically found that Illinois was "not declining jurisdiction nor [sic] conceding jurisdiction" 
to Utah. Judge Vaughan decided to wait until the Utah appellate court decided Mark's appeal 
of the Utah trial judge's decision regarding jurisdiction. We believe that Judge Vaughan's 
actions were consistent with the general puipose of the Act: 
"to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other States in child 
custody matters; [to] promote cooperation with the courts of other States; [to] assure 
that child custody litigation occurs in the State where the child and his or her family 
has the closest connection, and where evidence of the child's care, protection, 
trainingf,] and personal relationships is most readily available; to discourage 
controversies over child custody matters; to deter abductions; and to avoid relitigation 
of child custody decisions of other States." Richardson v. Richardson, 255 HI App. 
3d 1099, 1100-01, 625 N.E.2d 1122, U23 (1993). 
Mark wisely appealed the Utah trial judge's ruling on jurisdiction. If he had failed to 
appeal the Utah decision, he would not be able to argue in Illinois that the Utah trial court had 
erred on the jurisdictional issue. See In re Marriage ofArulpragasam & Eisele, 304 111. App. 
3d 139, 146, 709N.E.2d 725, 731 (1999); In re Marriage ofMauro, 187111. App. 3d 794, 
797,543 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1989), We also find that the Illinois trial judge in this case made 
a sound decision in vacating the preliminary injunction and effectively staying the Illinois 
action until the Utah appellate court renders a decision on Mark's appeal. We agree that this 
was the most effective and efficient way to fulfill the purpose of the Act. 
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Affinned. 
• u tinPKTMS and WELCH, JJ-. concurring. PONOVAN, J., with HOPKINS ana w * 
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